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Ability to Provide Price Transparency 
in the Cash Market for Dressed Steers: 
Evidence from South Dakota 
Scott W. Fausti and  Matthew A. Diersen 
The informational value of USDA's  former voluntary price reporting system is investi- 
gated for dressed-weight slaughter steers sold by South Dakota producers. The ability 
of the former system to promote price transparency in the cash market is evaluated 
using state-level mandatory price reportingdata collected from September 1999  to April 
2001.  The empirical framework examines the informational value of public price reports 
according  to the criteria established in the  market integration literature. The empirical 
results indicate that in the South Dakota cash market for dressed weight steers, the 
voluntary price reporting system fostered price transparency, and thus contributed to 
the price discovery process. Empirical evidence is also presented suggesting that strate- 
gic price reporting by market participants to influence the voluntary price reporting 
system was not detected during the period covered in this study. 
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Introduction 
The goal of public price reporting is accurate and timely market price reports (Lawrence, 
Shaffer, and Hayenga, 1996).  Accurate and timely market price reports are necessary for 
price discovery and for market efficiency (Ward, 1987). Political momentum behind the 
passage of mandatory price reporting (MPR)  legislation at  both the state  and  federal  levels 
originated with lobbying efforts by producer groups who were concerned about the effects 
of increased packer concentration and thinning public livestock markets on the accuracy 
of voluntary price reports, market transparency, price transparency, and price discovery. 
Market transparency refers to a market environment where all relevant information 
about market conditions necessary to efficiently complete transactions is publicly 
available to all market participants.lAl1  relevant information pertains to the public 
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dissemination of transaction price, volume, carcass quality, current supply and demand 
conditions, etc. Analogous to the financial equities literature (Bloomfield and O'Hare, 
1999; Pagano and Roell, 19961, market transparency plays a fundamental role in 
ensuring  fairness and efficiency in livestock markets by promoting competition and 
efficient price discovery. The lack of market transparency results in less informed 
market participants trading at a competitive disadvantage. One important component 
of market transparency is price transparency. Price transparency is defined as  a market 
condition where all relevant information on transaction prices is publicly available to 
all market participants. 
Several features of the South Dakota livestock industry make this an interesting case 
study to test the validity of  different price reporting mechanisms. While not ranking 
among the biggest feedlot states, South Dakota has a large and stable feedlot sector. 
Thus, major structural changes in the feedlot industry have not adversely impacted 
South Dakota's feedlot industry. In theory, feedlots in South Dakota appear to have a 
choice to sell to multiple packers in multiple states. South Dakota also has a relatively 
large number of farmer-feeders-feedlots  with fewer than 1,000 head capacity. Hence, 
concerns about transparency should be easier to identify in the presence of  a relatively 
large number of  market participants such as exist in South Dakota. Finally, a unique 
data set allows for detailed insights not available for other states. 
The accuracy of  voluntarily reported prices to the USDA's  Agricultural Marketing 
Service (AMS) is investigated here by  using South Dakota Mandatory Price Report 
(SDMPR) data that were collected prior to the implementation of the federal MPR sys- 
tem. Our objective is to investigate the empirical relationship between daily voluntary 
price reports released by the AMS and transactions mandatorily reported in the cash 
market for dressed weight steers in South Dakota. Specifically, we want to know if the 
AMS  Nebraska Direct voluntary price series (NEVPR) for dressed steers accurately 
reflected spot market prices reported in South Dakota. The answer may provide insight 
as  to whether the former voluntary price reporting (VPR) system failed to provide price 
transparency to the cash market, as asserted by livestock industry groups in favor of 
MPR legislation prior to its passage. 
Mandatory versus Voluntary Price Reporting: 
A Discussion of the Issues 
The reliability of the former VPR system was called into question by proponents of MPR, 
who claimed that (a)  market transparency was degraded because industry participants 
failed to report as much as 35%  to 40% of transa~tions;~  and (b)  a propensity existed for 
buyers and sellers  in the cash market to behave strategically  when voluntarily reporting 
market transa~tions.~  The questions raised  are of  concern because incomplete or 
inaccurate voluntary price reports have the potential to distort the flow of  information 
between voluntarily reported prices and actual market transactions. 
The Agricultural Marketing Service (USDMAMS, 2000) asserted that 35% to 40% of  all negotiated cattle transactions 
were not reported under the voluntary price reporting system. Note, under the former voluntary price reporting system, the 
AMS reported only confirmed transactions. 
Koontz (1999)  suggested there is potential for this type of behavior to occur. Several computer simulation studies con- 
cluded that public price reporting is inefficient under certain market conditions (Bastian, Koontz, and Menkhaus, 2001; 
Anderson et al., 1998). The Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) was also investigating this 
issue (USDMGIPSA, 1998). Fausti and Diersen  Voluntary Livestock Price Reporting  555 
The concern raised over the accuracy of the VPR system was deemed credible by policy 
makers in a number of  states prior to passage of MPR regulations at the federal level. 
Five states  (Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and South Dakota) passed legislation 
requiring MPR  prior  to  passage  of  federal regulations.  Legislation  implementing 
national livestock MPR was passed in October 1999, and the first publicly issued 
mandatory price report was released on April 2,2001. Upon implementation of federal 
MPR regulations, all state  reporting requirements ended. The U.S. Congress delegated 
the responsibility for collecting and reporting transaction data to the USDA's Agricul- 
tural Marketing Service. The selection of the AMS was an obvious choice because the 
AMS had been responsible for operating the existing national voluntary livestock price 
reporting system since 1946  (Livestock  Mandatory Price Reporting Review Team, 2001). 
Because the new MPR system for livestock markets replaced the system of VPR, the 
structure of  information in livestock markets, and in particular the cash market for 
slaughter cattle, has changed. A number of regional price reports published under the 
VPR system were discontinued following the  implementation of MPR. These series were 
the Montana Direct, South Dakota Direct, California DirectlArizona Directmevada 
Direct, Indiana/Michigan/Ohio Direct, Illinois Direct, Wyoming/South Dakotamebraska 
Direct, and Washington/Oregon/Idaho Direct. These regional voluntary price reports 
have been replaced with more aggregated mandatory price reports. The advantage of 
the new reports is the breakdown of direct sales into negotiated, formulated, and for- 
ward contract categories. Ironically, the disadvantage of the new reports is  the  potential 
loss of transparency of local market conditions-i.e.,  aggregation may mask any diver- 
gence between local market prices and aggregate prices. 
The legislation authorizing the federal mandatory reporting system has a sunset 
  la use.^ Potential policy concerns that may arise during the legislative process include: 
(a)  the cost imposed upon the packing industry by MPR requirements compared to the 
benefits realized from improved market transparency and price discovery; (b)  concern 
over the loss of  regional market information resulting from the loss of  regional AMS 
voluntarily reported prices, e.g., Montana Direct; and (c) the potential for collusive 
behavior by the packing industry as a consequence of  full information, under MPR, 
being provided to an oligopoly industry. 
This last issue has sparked some debate in the MPR literature. Wachenhiem and 
DeVuyst (2001)  discuss the  issue of market and price transparency in livestock markets. 
They argue that increased transparency under mandatory price reporting may reduce 
competition in the  fed cattle market. Njoroge (2003)  reaches a similar  conclusion.  Azzam 
(2003) arrives at the opposite conclusion in a recent paper about MPR. Discussing the 
robustness of transparency in terms of uncertainty over livestock prices under an  MPR 
system relative to a VPR system, Azzam (p. 388) concludes increased market informa- 
tion under MPR reduces price uncertainty relative to VPR. Azzam refers to Fed Cattle 
Market Simulator results reported by Anderson et al. (1998) indicating a variance- 
reduction effect of  increased public information. The underlying premise of  Azzam's 
assumption is that increased uncertainty in an MPR system is a consequence of fewer 
transactions being reported under a VPR system, resulting in increased price dispersion 
relative to actual dispersion of  market transaction prices. In simple terms, Azzam 
characterizes the issue as analogous to a sampling size issue. 
The legislative authorization for federal mandatory livestock price reporting expired in October of 2004. 556  December 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Price Transparency and Market Integration: 
A Discussion 
Price transparency is associated with the concept of market integration. The literature 
establishes this link by addressing the  relationship between competitive spatial equilib- 
rium and market integration. For example, it  has been demonstrated that competitive 
spatial equilibrium and market integration are related but distinctly different concepts 
(Barrett and Li, 2002; McNew, 1996; McNew and Fackler, 1997). When interregional 
trade is nonnegative, Barrett and Li (2002, p. 293) note that a long-run competitive 
spatial equilibrium condition  holds when marginal profit from arbitrage activity is  equal 
to zero. Furthermore, regional price differentials move one-for-one  with the costs associ- 
ated with spatial arbitrage when trade is positive. 
On the other hand, market integration, as discussed in the contestable market liter- 
ature "implies the transfer of Walrasian excess demand from one market to another, 
manifest in the physical flow of commodity, the transmission of price shocks from one 
market to another, or both (Barrett and Li, 2002, p. 293). Barrett and Li discuss the 
possibility of spatially linked markets being integrated, but not in competitive equilib- 
rium. This market condition is the  result of marginal profit from spatial arbitrage  being 
nonzero when trade is positive. They refer to this market outcome as  imperfect integra- 
tion. Under this scenario, a stable long-run equilibrium interregional price differential 
would not exist. If the zero marginal profit condition from spatial arbitrage does not 
prevail, then even with complete transmission  of  price shocks from one market to 
another, price transparency will not be provided to market participants because nonzero 
profits distort regional price differentials. The nature and magnitude of the distortion 
will not be transparent to all market participants. This market outcome results in 
market inefficiency because transaction cost is not minimized. 
Barrett and Li (2002, pp. 293-294) define perfect integration as  an  interregional spa- 
tial relationship possessing the following properties: "two markets are both integrated 
and in long-run competitive spatial equilibrium." We assert that the market condition 
of perfect integration is the  necessary and sufficient condition for the  existence of spatial 
price transparency. Spatial price transparency is defined as  price transparency existing 
between spatially linked interregional  market^.^ 
South Dakota exports a majority of fed cattle production to Nebraska for processing. 
South Dakota has minimal processing facilities located in the state,  implying fed cattle 
flow is  unidirectional. It  is assumed competitive spatial arbitrage exists  between the two 
cash markets. Therefore, the spatial relationship between Nebraska and South Dakota 
cash markets is consistent with the market conditions required for perfect integration 
and  the  use of linear cointegration techniques for empirical analysis, i.e., marginal profit 
to spatial arbitrage is  zero, trade is unidirectional and continuous, and transaction costs 
are ~tationary.~ 
Note that the individual market conditions of marginal profit from arbitrage being zero and the existence of  market 
integration are the only necessary conditions for the existence of spatial price transparency. 
'  The caveats raised in this literature that would render linear cointegration techniques inadequate for spatial market 
analysis are also discussed by McNew (1996)  and McNew and Fackler (1997).  In the empirical results section, empirical 
evidence of stationary transaction costs is provided. Note: South Dakota had two small cow slaughter plants operating during 
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Barrett and Li7s  (2002) definition of perfect integration requires the existence of two 
conditions between Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets. The first condition is for 
spatial equilibrium to exist between the Nebraska cash market and the South Dakota 
cash market. The second condition is for the complete and timely transmission of price 
shocks occurring in the Nebraska cash market to be transmitted to the South Dakota 
cash market. If these two conditions are met, then spatial price transparency exists 
between the Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets. However, the existence of 
spatial  price transparency between these cash markets predisposes, but does not ensure, 
the NEVPR system is an efficient price transmission mechanism. Empirical evidence 
is needed to support the proposition that the NEVPR system provided accurate and 
timely price information on Nebraska's cash market in a manner consistent with the 
existence of spatial price transparency between these two cash markets. 
Whether or not the NEVPR system can be considered an efficient price transmission 
mechanism for South Dakota producers depends on if the existence of  spatial price 
transparency can be verified empirically.  Testing the  proposition that the  NEVPR system 
transmitted price information consistent with the definition of spatial price transparency 
is based on two determinants: (a)  given unidirectional trade and regional competitive 
spatial arbitrage, Nebraska's  cash market determined prices in South Dakota's cash 
market for slaughter steers; and (b)  South Dakota's MPR mechanism collected all 
reported non-auction transaction data in South Dakota (South Dakota Codified Law, 
2000).7  Given these conditions, the following testable hypotheses are proposed: 
South Dakota's cash market has a long-run spatial equilibrium relationship with 
the  Nebraska cash market, and this relationship is reflected in the spatial  relation- 
ship between the SDMPR series and the NEVPR series. 
Price shocks to Nebraska's  cash market are accurately reflected in the NEVPR 
series and transmitted rapidly and completely to the SDMPR series in a manner 
consistent with the existence of spatial  price transparency between these spatially 
linked markets. 
Methodology 
We investigate empirically the spatial relationship between the NEVPR series and 
SDMPR series for dressed weight slaughter steers during the time period just before 
federal MPR rules went into effect. Specifically, a test is conducted to determine if the 
information contained in the  NEVPR series accurately reflects cash market transactions 
in South Dakota. Cointegration tests are applied to time-series data to determine if 
there is evidence indicating the existence of a long-run spatial relationship between the 
information contained in the NEVPR  series and the information contained in the 
SDMPR series. If a long-run relationship is found, then the next step is to employ an 
error correction model (ECM) to investigate the short-run disequilibria adjustment 
process. If empirical evidence from the error correction model indicates a robust trans- 
mission of price shocks from the NEVPR series to the SDMPR series, then there is 
This assumption assumes full compliance with price reporting regulations by all market participants. Therefore, the 
expected value of collected transaction prices is an unbiased estimate of equilibrium price and is consistent with Tomek 
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evidence of  spatial price transparency between the cash markets, and the NEVPR 
system accurately reflected this market characteristic. This implies that the NEVPR 
system was an accurate and efficient mechanism for transmitting price information to 
South Dakota producers. 
The use of cointegration tests to examine commodity price relationships and spatial 
relationships across regional markets is common in the literature (e.g., Ardeni, 1989; 
Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991).  Cointegration techniques are  especially useful for inves- 
tigating long-run relationships between economic variables exhibiting a nonstationary 
I(1) time-series process. Engle and Granger (1987) demonstrate that a linear combina- 
tion of two I(1) series can produce a stationary series of  KO). 
Two variables are  cointegrated over time if they individually follow a unit root process 
but jointly move together over time. The requirement that each variable follows a unit 
root process implies that individually each variable's  movement over time appears 
random and unpredictable, but the location of one variable provides information on the 
other variable's location if they are  cointegrated. The application of cointegration is well 
suited for investigating whether the NEVPR system accurately reflected actual market 
transactions in South Dakota because the  spatial  relationship between the  cash markets 
is not encumbered by the caveats raised in the spatial integration literature. 
Assume SDMPR, denotes the daily dressed weight cash price series for South  Dakota 
slaughter steers. Let NEVPR, denote the daily direct dressed weight cash price series for 
slaughter steers in Nebraska. To test for a cointegrated relationship between SDMPR, 
and NEVPR,, the first step is to determine if these price series have a unit root. The 
process begins by modeling the price series as an autoregressive process AR(p): 
(1)  SDMPR, = a + PISDMPR,_,  + ... + PpSDMPR,,  + E,, 
(2)  NEVPR,  = a + b1NEVPR,_, + ... + bpNEVPR,,  + e,, 
Testing for the existence of a unit root is done by using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test 
or the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test as proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 
1981). The decision criterion for test selection is based on the presence or absence of a 
serial correlation problem when  the first difference of  SDMPR, (i.e., ASDMPR,) is 
regressed on SDMPR,,.  If serial correlation is  detected, the ADF test is used. The order 
of  the autoregessive process (AR = p)  on which the ADF test is based is determined 
empiri~all~.~  After evaluating the data, as suggested by Gujarati (2003, pp. 816-8171, 
a random-walk-with-drift model was selected for the unit root test.g 
If it is established that both of the price series under consideration have a unit root, 
then estimated residuals are obtained from regressing SDMPR, on NEVPR, using 
ordinary least squares. Then to determine if SDMPR, and NEVPR, are cointegrated, 
Conducting  the ADF unit root test was done in a multi-step procedure as suggested by Gujarati (2003, p. 817). First, the 
simple Dickey-Fuller  test is conducted by regressing the first difference of the variable of interest, Y,,  on Y,_,  using an OLS 
procedure (SAS Institute, Inc., 1993).  ADurbin-Watson d test statistic was estimated to detect the presence of serial correla- 
tion. If serial correlation was detected, based on a 5%  critical value, a first-order autoregressive model was estimated using 
OLS. If serial correlation was detected in this step, then a second-order  autoregressive model was estimated, and so on until 
the error term of the ADF equation was determined to be serially uncorrelated. Higher order models used Durbin's t-test, 
based on a 5%  critical value, as suggested in the SASIETS  User's Guide. 
'For a discussion ofunit root testing procedures andtestingfor cointegration  betweennonstationary time-seriesvariables, 
see Gujarati (2003). The general formof the ADF test is based on: AY,  = Y, - Y,.,  = 6, + QY,.,  + B:=,  E~AY,.~  + v,,  where Q = 1  - p,. 
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these residuals are evaluated by using either the DF or ADF test for detecting the 
existence of a unit root in the residual series.''  Test selection is again based on if serial 
correlation is detected. 
Data 
In July of  1999, South Dakota Codified Law, Chapter 40-15B (SDCL, 2000) required 
mandatory livestock price reporting in South Dakota. There was a period of time when 
the South Dakota Department of Agriculture formalized the reporting rules, and data 
collection began in late August of  1999. All private livestock transactions were to be 
reported, while public auction purchases were excluded from the reportingrequirement. 
Civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance were incorporated into the legislation. 
The Department of Agriculture collected data until federal MPR began. The Secretary 
of Agriculture's office supplied all of the collected data to the authors in July of 2001. 
The data  contained daily transactions from September 1999  through March 2001. The 
complete MPR data set supplied by the State  of South Dakota contains transaction data 
on over 900,000 head of  cattle reported by lots. There were a small number of  trans- 
actions where the number of head in a lot was missing or not known with certainty at 
the time of reporting. Included in the data were transactions for slaughter cows, bulls, 
and mixed lots. Transactions for fed steers, fed heifers, and mixed lots of fed steers and 
heifers covered 720,678 head over the entire collecting period. During calendar year 
2000, packers purchased 400,486 head of fed cattle. By comparison, USDA's National 
Agricultural Statistics  Service (USDANASS, 2001)  reported that  South Dakota feedlots 
marketed 624,000 head in  2000, some ofwhich would have been finished cows and bulls. 
However, we do not suspect any noncompliance, as several fed-cattle auctions were 
likely markets for the remaining head not covered in the series. 
Live weight sales, grid sales, forward contract sales, marketing agreement transac- 
tions, and heifer and Holstein transactions were excluded from the sample. The SDMPR 
data  include only daily weighted average transaction data for dressed weight steers,  and 
contain 87,533 head and 803 recorded transactions.'' 
The VPR series selected for this study is compiled from the NEVPR for steers sold on 
a dressed weight basis. Only the prices for dressed weight steers were used, and the 
AMS reported prices on a weighted average basis. The Nebraska series was selected 
because it  represents a major market and processing area for South Dakota's slaughter 
cattle. Table 1  reports summary statistics for the price series used in the empirical 
analysis. 
Table 2 offers empirical evidence that  the  mean price differential is statistically equal 
to zero between the SDMPR price series and the NEVPR series. The statistically 
insignificant price differential has  an  interesting  interpretation. When selling  slaughter 
lo The issue of serial correlation was addressed for each residual series in the same manner discussed in footnote 8. The 
cointegrating regression is: Y,  = y + O1X,  + c,. The residual regression is: c, - c,., = 6, + @c,., + z:=,  ~,Ac,.~  + v,. The unit root 
hypothesis test is: H,: @ = 0,  or H,: @ < 0.  If the null hypothesis is rejected, then the series is stationary. 
l1 One packer was dropped from the data set because it was determined this packer purchased cattle that had specific 
characteristics  demanded by niche markets. This  packer participated in only 55 cash transactions and purchased 1,462  head 
during the period covered by the study. Individual daily South Dakota transactions were converted into a daily weighted 
average price based on volume using the sales volume of a single transaction as a percentage of total transaction  volume for 
the day to determine  the weight given to a single transaction  price. We  rely on the rationale offered by Tomek (1980)  for using 
a weighted average price. 560  December 2004  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of  Cash Markets for Dressed-Weight Steers 
(September 1999-March 2001) 
Number  Standard 
of Daily  Mean  Deviation 
Price Series  Observations  ($/~wt)  ($/cwt) 
NEVPR  13  1  $111.79  $7.21 
SDMPR  13  1  $111.90  $7.24 
Notes: Voluntary price reporting (VPR) data were collected from USDAIAMS report No. WKLS130 (various dates). The 
number of daily dressed weight cash transactions in South Dakota varied from week to week. Data represent a concord- 
ance between South Dakota and Nebraska based on matched transaction dates. 
Table 2. Matched Pairs Means Test Between Price Series 
Number  Matched Pair:  p-Value 
of Daily  Mean Difference Test  Null Hypothesis 
Price Series  Observations  ($/cwt)  (H,: U, -  U, = 0) 
SDMPR and NEVPR  13  1  $0.11  0.49 
Notes: The Anderson-Darling normality test (Gujarati, 2003, p. 147)  was applied, and the test results indicate that the 
distributions for the paired differences were not normally distributed. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test was selected to test 
the null hypothesis that the mean of the pair differences  was zero (Newbold, 1995, p. 391). 
cattle on a dressed weight basis, the price paid is based on delivery at the plant. Thus, 
the implication of a zero price differential is that South Dakota producers are  receiving 
the same price for cattle sold dressed weight as Nebraska producers.12  This suggests 
there is no statistical evidence of strategically selective voluntary price reporting as  has 
been suggested by  some proponents of  MPR. Strategic price reporting by  packers or 
feedlots might be reflected in a positive price differential if packers understated trans- 
action prices, or negative iffeedlots overstated transaction prices. For example, assume 
prices voluntarily reported by packing plants in Nebraska to the AMS do not include all 
cattle purchased at  a price above the average transaction price during a specific trading 
window, but all prices paid during that trading window in South Dakota are reported 
as a result of  state MPR  regulations. This scenario would result in a positive price 
differential occurring in the data, in the favor of  South Dakota producers selling in the 
Nebraska market. The positive price differential might be the result of  the packing 
industry in Nebraska engaging in selective price reporting of transaction prices to create 
a negative bias in the NEVPR. This type of  strategic price reporting behavior was being 
investigated by  the USDNGrain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) prior to implementation of  the current federal mandatory price reporting 
system (USDAIGIPSA, 1998). The empirical results reported in table 2 indicate there 
is no direct evidence of this type of  behavior occurring during the period SDMPR was 
in effect. 
l2 Dressed weight price quotes do not include transport cost or pencil shrink. Fausti and Diersen  Voluntary Livestock Price Reporting  56  1 
Empirical Results: 
Testing for Unit Roots and Cointegration 
Table 3 presents the DF or ADF test statistics and the associatedp-values for the unit 
root tests for each of  the price series. The associated test statistic for detecting the pres- 
ence of  serial correlation  is the Durbin-Watson or Durbin's t.13 Lagged terms were added 
to the ADF equation until the error structure was empirically verified as whitened. 
As observed from table 3, the unit root hypothesis test indicates both price series are 
nonstationary. Engle and Granger (1987) state that if  two series are I(1), then it is 
possible that a linear combination of  the two series is I(0).  Engle and Granger propose 
a cointegrating regression that regresses one I(1) series on another I(1) series. The 
residual series generated by the cointegration regression is tested for the existence of 
a unit root. If the unit root test determines the existence of  a unit root, then the two 
series are not cointegrated and no long-term relationship exists between the two time- 
series variables. The cointegration test results are presented in table 4. 
The results of  the cointegration analysis indicate that the NEVPR series is cointe- 
grated with actual transaction data collected by the State of  South Dakota during the 
19-month  period covered in this study. The parameter estimate in table 4 can be inter- 
preted as the long-run relationship between the two price series. The estimate's value 
being nearly one supports our early conclusion that there is no direct evidence of 
strategic price reporting. 
We conclude that the empirical evidence supports our first hypothesis (i.e., the exist- 
ence of  a long-run spatial price equilibrium relationship). The economic interpretation 
is that competitive spatial arbitrage forged a long-run equilibrium  relationship between 
the Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets. This equilibrium relationship could only 
be reflected in the NEVPR and SDMPR data if the NEVPR series and the SDMPR series 
were accurately reporting actual market transactions in their respective markets. 
As indicated by the empirical evidence in table 4, in the long run,  producers in South 
Dakota received prices consistent with what was being reported by the AMS for the 
region. However, the empirical evidence of  highly cointegrated price series over the 
19-month  period does not provide insight on interregional market response to short-run 
deviations away from the empirically established long-run relationship. The MPR 
literature suggests that the ability of  the VPR system to provide price transparency to 
the market was degraded compared to an MPR system. If this conjecture is correct, then 
short-run divergence from the long-run equilibrium relationship would persist and, by 
definition, spatial price transparency is not possible. To investigate this issue, an error 
correction mechanism is employed to examine the effect of  short-run anomalies on the 
empirically established long-run relationship discussed above. 
Empirical Results: 
Error Correction Model 
We have established empirically that a long-run equilibrium relationship existed 
between the NEVPR series and the SDMPR series, which supports the hypothesis that 
a long-run relationship existed between the Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets. 
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Table 3. Unit Root Test Results 
Number of Daily  Tau 
Price Series  Observations  Statistic  p-Value 
NEVPR " 
SDMPR 
" The order of  the autoregressive model selected for the unit root test is AR(O), indicating the DF test is appropriate 
(DW = 2.085). 
The order of the autoregressive model selected is AR(l), indicating the use of  the ADF test (Dubin's t = -1.05). 
Table 4. SDMPR Cointegration Test Results 
Cointegrating Regression 
Price Series  No. of Daily  Intercept  Parameter  Tau 
Cointegrating Regressions  Observations  Estimate  Estimate  Statistic  p-Value 
SDMPR and NEVPR  131  0.641  0.995  -11.05  0.001 
Note: The order of  the autoregressive model selected is AR(O),  indicating the DF test is appropriate (DW = 2.002). 
While the estimated long-run spatial relationship is statistically significant, it is still 
possible to speculate  that sustained short-run deviations from the  long-run equilibrium 
relationship could pose a barrier to spatially linked markets achieving spatial price 
transparency and hinder price discovery. Sustained short-run deviations would be 
evidence of the  failure of the  VPR system to ad  as an  efficient public mechanism for the 
transmission of information about changing market conditions. An ECM modeling pro- 
cedure is used to investigate this issue. 
A price shock to the Nebraska cash market will eventually be reflected in the direct 
price paid to South Dakota producers. Simply stated, a price shock of x dollars per cwt 
at  time t will disrupt the long-run equilibrium price relationship between Nebraska and 
South Dakota cash markets. The disequilibrium condition will persist until the South 
Dakota market fully adjusts to the price shock in some future period t + n, where n is 
the number of periods needed for full adjustment to take place. It  is during this period 
of disequilibrium that spatial price transparency can be afYected.14  The length of time 
(n)  it takes for the transmission of  a price shock opens a window of  opportunity for 
short-run profitable arbitrage activities to occur and disrupt price transparency.15 How- 
ever, if a market distortion occurs which allows positive marginal profit from arbitrage 
activities to persist in the long run, then spatial price transparency disappears. Barrett 
and Li (2002) refer to this scenario as imperfect integration. However, the empirical 
evidence does not support the existence of this possible market outcome. 
The answer to  the question of how effective the  former VPR system was in  facilitating 
price transparency and promoting price discovery in the short run depends on how 
robust the price shock transmission mechanism was between Nebraska and South 
Dakota's cash markets and how accurate the NEVPR and SDMPR data  reflected the 
14 Koontz (1996) reported that packers and feedlots are more likely to withhold transaction information during periods of 
sharp price movements. 
l5 The possibility of excess profit potential arising in this type of  situation has been alluded to by Goodwin and Schroeder 
(1991)  and Tomek (1980). Fausti and Diersen  Voluntary  Livestock Price Reporting  563 
Table 5. Error Correction Model OLS Estimates 
ECM Regression Estimates 
Price Series  No. of Daily  Intercept  Slope  Speed-of-Adjustment 
ECM Regressions  Observations  Estimate  Estimate  Estimate 
SDMPR and NEVPR  130  0.014  0.915  -0.963 
(0.19)  (15.35)  (- 10.85) 
Notes: Student t test statistics are given in parentheses below the respective parameter estimate. The ECM  model tested 
negative for the presence of serial correlation (DW  d-statistic = 1.99). 
shock. To empirically test if a price shock to the long-run equilibrium relationship has 
a sustained negative effect on spatial price transparency, analysis of short-run devia- 
tions from long-run equilibrium will be carried out with an ECM modeling procedure. 
Based on the work by Granger (1981,1983), the Granger Representation Theorem 
states that if two time-series variables are cointegrated, then the  relationship between 
them can be expressed as an ECM. If two time-series variables are cointegrated, there 
is a long-run equilibrium relationship. The error term of  the cointegrating regression 
is treated as the equilibrium error, reflecting a short-run divergence from long-run 
equilibrium. The error term reflects the short-run adjustment mechanism that links 
long-run behavior to short-run behavior during periods of  short-run deviations from 
long-run equilibrium. 
Formally, the error correction mechanism for a pair of cointegrated series is defined 
as: 
ASDMPR,  = yo + ylANEVPRt + y,~,-,  + z,, 
where A is the first-difference operator, z, is the random error term, and E,,  is the equi- 
librium error term estimated from the cointegrating regression, lagged one period. The 
variables SDMPR, and  NEVPR, are the  price series defined in equations (1)  and (2). The 
parameter yo is the intercept coefficient. The parameter y, is the slope coefficient and 
is interpreted as the short-run relationship between ASDMPR, and ANEVPR,. The 
parameter y, is interpreted as the "speed-of-adjustmentn  coefficient to short-run devia- 
tions from long-run equilibrium (Gujarati,  2003, p. 825). The error correction model was 
estimated using OLS. The empirical estimates are provided in table 5. 
The intercept estimate in table 5 cannot be rejected as being statistically different 
from zero, implying that the long-run equilibrium relationship is stationary if there are 
no price shocks affecting the system. This result provides empirical evidence that 
transaction costs were stationary during the  period covered in this study. Therefore, the 
stationary caveat raised by Barrett and Li (2002) does not apply to the econometric 
modeling procedure selected for this study. 
The slope parameter estimate (table 5) is significant, with ap-value of less than 0.001. 
The slope parameter estimate indicates that if a price shock af'fects the Nebraska price 
series in period t, then 91.5% of  this shock will be reflected in the SDMPR series in 
period t. 
The "speed-of-adjustment" parameter estimate (table 5) is also significant, having a 
p-value of  less than 0.001. This parameter represents the average proportion of the 
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series in period t + 1. For instance, the ECM slope parameter estimate indicates 91.5% 
of  the price shock affecting the NEVPR series in period t will be transmitted to the 
SDMPR series in period t. The residual of  the price shock that was not transmitted in 
period t is 8.5%.  Thus, the long-run equilibrium relationship is disrupted in period t.  In 
period t + 1, the "speed-of-adjustment" coefficient shows that 96.3% of  the residual 
resulting from the price shock will be transmitted in period t + 1. Therefore, in period 
t + 1,99.68%  of  the price shock has been transmitted to the SDMPR series and conse- 
quently will be reflected in the next daily transaction period occurring after the shock.16 
The faster a price shock is transmitted from one series to another, the greater is the 
degree of  spatial price transparency between the two series. 
The "speed-of-adjustment" estimate leads to the conclusion that spatial price 
transparency existed between the South Dakota and Nebraska cash markets, and the 
SDMPR and the NEVPR  series accurately reflected this market characteristic. The 
empirical evidence also implies the information contained in the NEVPR did contribute 
to price transparency and aided producers in the price discovery process in both the 
Nebraska and South Dakota cash markets. 
Conclusions and  Summary 
The debate over whether the VPR system engendered price transparency and promoted 
price discovery is an empirical issue left unanswered in the literature. Empirical evi- 
dence provided here supports the view that the goal of public price reporting to provide 
accurate and timely market price reporting was achieved for the markets discussed 
here. 
Our empirical results provide insights into two issues raised in the literature 
regarding the robustness of the VPR system as  it existed before federal MPR regulations 
went into effect. First, we found empirical evidence of  spatial price transparency, and 
the SDMPR and NEVPR data reflect this market characteristic. Second, comparing the 
SDMPR series to the NEVPR series provided empirical evidence that suggests strategic 
voluntary price reporting did not occur during the period MPR was in effect in South 
Dakota, although this result may not be true nationwide. 
This study is the first to offer empirical evidence that the VPR system provided 
accurate information on market prices. While our study only covers one small part of the 
livestock sector, it raises the question that if the former VPR  system was an efficient 
mechanism for promoting price transparency in the cash market for dressed weight 
steers in South Dakota, was VPR also effective in other regions and for other types of 
livestock? Although we are not advocating that the VPR system was more robust than 
the new federal MPR system, there is evidence showing the former system was not as 
flawed as proponents of  MPR suggested. But, it is not necessary to justify the need for 
MPR based on the assertion that the former voluntary price reporting system degraded 
price transparency in the cash market for slaughter cattle. Our analysis reveals South 
Dakota provides one case study where this assertion is questionable. 
Finally, we conclude that additional research is needed to answer the following 
important questions: 
l8 The price adjustment estimate is calculated as follows: 91.5% + (0.963)(8.5%)  = 99.68%. Fausti and Diersen  Voluntary Livestock Price Reporting  565 
What are the costs and benefits associated with the federal MPR system? 
Is the loss of market information from smaller regional voluntary price reports 
hindering market transparency and price discovery in markets where voluntary 
price reports were discontinued? 
Are there other regional cattle markets or other types of livestock markets where 
the former VPR system was an efficient mechanism for promoting market trans- 
parency and price discovery? 
[Received  March 2004;Jinal revision received October 2004.1 
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